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The relationship  between education and wages is one of the most studied topics in
labor economics. Since the 1970's, researchers  have found a strong, positive relationship
between educational attainment and wages in country after country. Most of this research
has taken Mincer's (1974) formulation  as a starting point. This formulation  states that
the log of the observed wage rate is an additive  function of a linear term in years of
completed  schooling and a quadratic term in experience. The coefficient on the years of
completed  schooling is frequently referred to as the "rate of return" to education (for
example Card 1999; Willis 1986).2
The log-linear relationship  between wages and years of completed education  has an
obvious implication: Controlling  for experience,  every year of education, no matter at
what level, adds to log earnings  by the same amount. For analytical purposes, it is
convenient  to break down this assumption  into two components. First, the log-linear
specification  assumes that the rate of return to education  is the same across schooling
levels. This assumption  will not hold if the mean rate of return is higher for some levels
than others-say,  secondary school compared to primary school-or  for some kinds of
schooling-say,  university education  compared to post-secondary  vocational training.
Such differences  could be driven by a multitude of factors, including differences in the
quality of education across levels, or changes in the supply of and demand for graduates
2 Strictly speaking, this is only the case if a number  of conditions  are met (for example, if the direct private
costs of education are zero, and if there is no grade repetition). These conditions  are unlikely to hold
perfectly in practice. In this paper I refer to the coefficient  on education  in the Mincerian regression as the
"rate of return" for convenience, even though it would  be more accurate to describe it as the "wage
premium" or "wage increment".which have an effect on the price which these graduates  can command in the labor
market. Second, the log-linear  specification  assumes that the rate of return to an
additional year of schooling  is no higher for the last year of schooling in a particular
level-primary,  secondary,  university-than  in any other intervening  year. This may not
hold if credentials  themselves are rewarded,  a hypothesis known as the "sheepskin effect"
in the literature.
The assumption of linearity in the relationship  between log wages and schooling
has received much attention in the United  States (see, for example,  Card 1999; Deschenes
2000; Heckman, Layne-Farrar,  and Todd 1996; Hungerford  and Solon 1987; Katz and
Murphy 1993; Katz and Autor 1999; Park 1994). There are also literally hundreds of
empirical studies on the relationship  between wages and education in Less Developed
Countries (LDCs) (for reviews see Psacharopoulos  1973, 1981, 1985, 1989 and 1994).
Many of these studies have attempted to identify differences in the rate of return across
levels, but the data and methods used are often poor at best (see, for example, Bennell
1996  for a critique). 3
In this paper, I use data from a recent, high-quality  household survey conducted in
the Philippines  to test the fit of the log-linear  relationship  between wages and schooling.
Like many middle-income  countries, the Philippines  has a large nurnber of people in the
labor force who have received very different amounts of schooling--ranging from no
formal education  whatsoever,  to completed university  education. This allows me to
inspect the relationship  between log wages and education over a broader range than
3Two  studies  which parametrize the earnings function in a similar way to the analysis conducted in this
paper focus on Brazil (Lam and Schoeni 1993;  Strauss and Thomas 1996). Both find convexity in the
relationship  between market wages and education, and significant,  large sheepskin effects associated with
the completion  of particular years of schooling.
3would be the case in the United States. The Philippines  has also seen important
economic  changes in the last two decades, including a supply-push  to make secondary
education  universal, volatility in various economic  indicators, including aggregate GDP
growth, and substantial differences in the rate of growth of output and productivity  across
sectors. These changes,  many of which are not yet complete, may result in differences  in
the rate of return to education  across levels and across years which are large, at least in
the short run.
The rest of the paper proceeds  as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of
education and labor markets in the Philippines,  including a discussion of recent literature.
Section 3 describes the data set. In Section  4, I discuss the econometric specification.
Section 5 presents results on the differences  in rates of return across levels, and across
years within levels. Section 6 concludes.
2.  Education  in the Philippines
Basic education in the Philippines is acquired in two levels: primary education (six
years), and secondary  education (four years). Graduates  from secondary school can
continue on to university (five years) or post-secondary  vocational training (up to four
years). 4 As in most countries, there are both public and private providers of education,
and the latter are particularly important  at higher levels of education: Private providers of
education account for a very small fraction of total enrollment in primary school (7%),
but much larger fractions for secondary  school (22%), and a majority of tertiary
4Much  of this section is based on Asian Development  Bank and World Bank (1999).
4education (77%). Total expenditures  on education  in the Philippines stood at 6.9% of
GDP in 1997-roughly  comparable  to the amount spent by other countries in a similar
income bracket. The fraction of total expenditures  on education which is made by private
households in the Philippines (43%) is high relative to other countries.
The Philippines has achieved impressively  high enrollment  rates in primary and
secondary  education for its income level. Administrative  data indicate that the gross
enrollment  rate in secondary  school-the  fraction of children aged 13-16 enrolled in
school-was  75% in the Philippines  in 1997 (Asian Development  Bank and World Bank
1999, p. 158). But this high aggregate  figure for the Philippines  masks important
differences by region: The gross enrollment  ratio in secondary  school in the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao, for example,  was only 29.7%. There are also differences
by gender: Analysis of the Annual Poverty Indicator Survey (APIS) shows that in rural
areas 84.1% of girls aged 13-16,  but only 71.1% of boys were attending school in 1998;
in urban areas, comparable figures were 90.4% for girls and 84.7% for boys. 5
The low quality of basic education  is an oft-voiced concern in the Philippines
(Asian Development  Bank and World Bank 2000). Poorly prepared and unmotivated
teachers, inadequate teaching  materials, and decaying infrastructure  are all cited as
problems. So is a misallocation  of resources in the public system, with a very large
percentage of total expenditures going to teacher salaries (87.7% in 1999, up from 74.3%
in 1990), to the detriment of expenditures on maintenance  and other operating
expenditures  (8.8% in 1999, down from 16.5% in 1990) (Asian Development  Bank and
World Bank 1999, 112). Filipino students perform poorly on international tests, and
5 Differences  by gender and region are significant at the 0.1% level or better. Similar figures, based on the
1998 Philippines  Demographic and Health Survey,  can be found in Filmer (1999).
5poorly on tests designed by the Department  of Education,  Culture and Sports which are
intended to measure minimum acceptable  levels of achievement. The quality of
education provided by the private sector appears to be noticeably higher (Jimenez et. al.
1995).6
There are numerous studies about the relationship  between schooling and labor
market performance  in the Philippines  (for example,  Hossain and Psacharopolous 1994;
Lanzona 1997; Maluccio 1998; Tan and Paqueo 1989). None of these studies focus on
the issue of possible non-linearities in the earnings function  per se, and those which use
national-level  data are by now outdated. The Lanzona (1997) and Maluccio (1998)
papers are based on a panel of households interviewed  in 1978, 1983, and 1994. Because
the households selected are all in a single  province of the 78 which exist in the
Philippines (the province of Camarines Sur, in the Bicol region), it is not clear whether
the results in these papers are applicable to the country at large.
3.  The data set
This paper is largely based on the 1998 Annual Poverty Indicator Survey (APIS).
The APIS covered 38,710 households,  including 195,791  individuals. It is the first
nationwide multipurpose survey conducted in the Philippines,  and includes a basic
consumption  and income module, as well as modules  addressing the educational
6 The low quality of education may be one of the factors contributing  to the poor economic  performance  of
the Philippines. Since 1984,  real GDP per capita has essentially  been stagnant: The total change in real
GDP per capita between 1984 and 1999  was 2.6%, a very small amount indeed in comparison  with many of
the Philippines' East Asian neighbors,  which posted annual growth rates above 5% for much of the period.
Productivity in the Philippines  declined for the economy  as a whole (by about 0.9% over the fifteen-year
period), and fell dramatically  in industry (declining  by 17.0%  during the period).
6attainment,  health status, and degree of contraceptive  use by various household members.
Exceptionally,  the 1998 APIS also included a module intended to capture the household-
level effects of the dual financial and El Nino crises in the Philippines  in 1998 (see Datt
and Hoogeveen  2000).
The wage module in the APIS is quite detailed. It asks all household members
aged 5 and older about salaries and wages earned in two three-month  periods prior to the
survey (April 1 to June 30, and July 1 to September 30). Data is gathered separately for
the "primary"  job and "others". The value of "basic salaries and wages, in cash or in
kind" is recorded separately from the value of "allowances,  honoraria, tips, housing,
clothing, food, etc., in cash or in kind" (separately  for both jobs, where applicable). In
addition, the survey asks about the number  of full days worked, the average number of
working hours in these full days, the number of less-than-full days worked, and the
average number of hours worked in these less-than-full  days (again, separately for both
jobs, where applicable). Information on the number of hours and days is collected
separately  for the months of July, August, and September (but no information  on days or
hours is collected for April through June). Like most surveys of its kind, the APIS also
includes questions about the sector of employment,  business classification, and class of
worker for those employed. Finally, all adults who have not held ajob at all in the six
months prior to the survey are asked if they have been looking for work and, if they have
not, why.
7 About 60% of the households in the 1998  APIS are part of a panel with a survey carried out in 1997,  the
Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES). The FIES, which has been conducted in three-year
intervals since 1985,  has important advantages over the APIS-most  notably,  the fact that the consumption
and income modules are much more extensive. But the FIES is not truly a multi-purpose survey. It
includes information only on very  basic household  demographics  and, for example, no information on the
educational attainment  of household  members other than the household  head.  The large difference in the
7I construct mean hourly wages for the three-month  period prior to the survey by
adding the "wage" and "allowance" components  for the main job, and dividing this by
the total number of hours worked.  All wages are deflated  with provincial-level  price
deflators-one  for each of the 73 provinces in the country, as well as, separately, the 11
biggest cities (Balisacan  2000). I consider only men working in the wage-earning sector,
rather than all employed men. 8 This is because very few self-employed  men report
"wages", and it is not clear what to make of the wage data for those who report being
self-employed  and earning wages on the same  job.  For similar reasons, the analysis in
this paper is limited to the main job, because some men whose main job is in the wage-
earning sector have a second  job where they are self-employed. 9 The education module
in the APIS is also reasonably  detailed. For the purposes of this paper, the relevant
question asks about the highest grade completed  by all household members aged 6 and
older. With the exception of those currently enrolled in school, the APIS provides no
information  about the kind of school attended  by labor force participants, including
whether it was public or private.
There are 21,882 men in the APIS who report all of the necessary information  for
the construction of hourly wages, including data on wages, allowances,  days and hours
worked on the main job, as well as information  on own schooling. In addition, we can
length of the consumption  and income modules in the APIS and the FIES means that it is not possible to
compare changes in income or consumption  in any straightforward  way.
8The  APIS gives seven categories  for class of worker: (i) worked for private household; (ii) worked for
private establishment;  (iii) worked for government  / government  corporation;  (iv) self employed without
any employee;  (v) employer in own family operated farm or business; (vi) worked with pay on own family-
operated farm or business; (vii) worked without  pay on own family-operated  farm or business. The
analysis in this paper is restricted to categories  (i), (ii), (iii), and (vi) above.
9 Note, however, that only a tiny fraction (0.34%) of men in the sample who hold a wage-earning  main job
report holding a second wage-earning  job, so restricting  the analysis to the main job is unlikely to make
much of a difference.
8construct measures of parental education,  and a measure of male sibling education for
two sub-samples  (corresponding  to 2,355, and 2,851 men, respectively). These sub-
samples  can be useful to help control for various biases-in  particular, possible biases
induced by the correlation between unobserved ability,  own schooling, and selection into
the wage-earning  sector-but  they have important  limitations,  both because of their much
smaller size, and because they are arguably non-random:  Information on parental
education  is only available for wage-earning  children of the household head in
households in which both parents are still present, while information  on the education  and
earnings of male siblings is only available for children of the household head in
households with at least two male children, both of whom are living at home, and both of
whom earn wages. As a result, these samples will tend to be younger, and may be biased
if formation of an independent household  is endogenous.
4.  Estimation  strategy
The analysis in this paper is limited to men only. This is somewhat arbitrary,
although the much larger sample size for wage-earning men (21,882) than women
(11,228) in the APIS is an important advantage. In addition, limiting the sample to men
may minimize two econometric problems. First, it is likely that non-random selection
into the labor market is more of a concern for women than for men. Second, like most
household surveys, the APIS did not collect information  on labor market experience, so I
approximate  actual experience  with "potential experience",  defined as X - A - S - 6,
where A stands for age in years, and S is the years of completed schooling. This
9formulation,  which is standard  in the literature, assumes that all children start schooling
at age 6 and complete S years of schooling  in exactly S years, and begin accumulating
labor market experience as soon as they leave school. "Potential  experience" could
seriously over-estimate  the number of years of experience of women if women who are
currently in the labor market have taken time out at an earlier point in their career to raise
children (for example, Altonji and Blank 1999).1o  Finally, because of the very small
number of observations,  I exclude from the sample men whose highest degree is post-
secondary vocational  training or post-college  education  (Master's or Ph.D.).
To estimate the degree of convexity in the earnings function, and to capture any
possible sheepskin effects, I use spline functions  and semi-parametric  regressions. A
discontinuous  spline function, proposed by Hungerford  and Solon (1987), and which has
since formed the basis for much of the literature  on "sheepskin effects" in the United
States, can be specified as follows:
(1)  logW,  = a + XX,  + 8X 2i + Psi + iD6j + 0[(S 1-6)*D6i]  + yDlOi  + X[(Si-  O)*D1O i] +
E1)15i  + vi.
where S and X are the years of completed  schooling  and potential experience, D6, D1O,
and D15 are dummy variables for those who have completed at least six, ten, and fifteen
years of schooling,  respectively, [(Si-6)*D6i]  is an interaction  term between the D6
'0 The use of "potential  experience" rather than actual experience  may also introduce  biases in the
estimation  of the effects of experience on earnings-for  example, if children start school late, or if
repetition rates are anything  other than zero. "Potential  experience" will then tend to overstate actual
experience,  and the coefficient  on experience  may be a (downward)  biased estimate of the returns to actual
experience.
10dummy  and S-6, [(Si-lO)*D10]  is an interaction term between the D10 dummy and S-10,
and vi is the error term in the regression. In this piece-wise linear specification, the mean
rate of return to the first five years of education  is given by the parameter ,B;  the rate of
return to the sixth year of education  is given by the sum of the parameters ,B  and  ; the
mean rate of return to the first three years of secondary  schooling  is given by the sum of
the parameters 1  and 0; the rate of return to the last year of secondary school is given by
the sum of the parameters 13,  0, and y; the mean rate of return to the first four years of
university  is given by the sum of the parameters 1,  0, and 7,;  while the rate of return to the
last year of university is given by the sum of f3,  0, X,  and 4. An alternative, which
suppresses the three dummy variables (but not the interaction terms), gives the mean rate
of return to education by level.
One concerr.  with this estimation framework  is the possible effect of individual
heterogeneity. Card (1999) generalizes the discussion of "ability bias" in earnings
functions by showing that heterogeneity  can have an effect on both the intercept and the
slope of a given individual's eamings function. Either one of these conditions is enough
to upward-bias the coefficient on schooling  in a cross-sectional  earnings regression, but a
positive correlation between schooling and the marginal  return to schooling can also
result in an estimated convex relationship  in a cross-sectional  regression of log earnings
on schooling-even  in the absence of any convexity in the underlying individual earnings
functions.
To partially control for ability, I run two additional sets of regressions. First, I limit
the sample to men for whom we have data on parental  education, and include the years of
completed schooling  of both parents as controls. Second, I limit the sample to men for
11whom we have data on the education and earnings  of male siblings, and use "within"
estimators which include the total education of all wage-earning  male siblings as a
control (see Card 1999  for a general discussion,  and Heckman  and Hotz 1986,  and Lam
and Schoeni 1993 for applications in LDC settings). An additional advantage of these
regressions  is that including partial controls for ability should reduce the biases
associated with non-random  selection into the wage-earning  sector if this selection  is
itself partly deterrnined  by ability."'
I also consider two semi-parametric  regression models. In the first, experience  and
squared experience are still assumed to have an additive effect on log wages, but
education  is captured by fifteen schooling  dummies:
(2)  logWi=a+lSi  +X;+xi  j+Ei,
This imposes fewer restrictions than a spline function (see also Hungerford and Solon
1987; Lam and Schoeni 1993; Strauss and Thomas 1996). Here, too, I estimate the
"bare-bones" semi-parametric  regression,  as well as regressions which include parental
An alternative  would have been to correct explicitly  for selection  with the correction proposed  by
Heckman (1976). In separate results (not reported, but available from the author upon request),  I compare
OLS estimates  with estimates from a Heckman selection  model, in which education of the spouse is used as
an identifying  variable for a sub-sample  of married men in the APIS. The selection-corrected  estimates are
very similar  to the simple OLS estimates:  In the full sample of married men, for example, the coefficient  on
own schooling  is .122 in the OLS regression,  and .128 in the selection-corrected  regression. These
estimates assume that spousal education  helps determine  participation  in the wage-earning sector, through
its effect on household  income, but does not have an independent  effect on own productivity and wages.
This seems plausible,  but assortative  mating between husbands and wives in terms of unobserved  ability
may cast some doubts on this identification  strategy (for a discussion, see Behrman, Birdsall, and
Deolalikar 1995;  Behrman, Rosenzweig,  and Taubman 1994;  and Lam and Schoeni 1993). Another  oft-
used candidate for identification,  the amount of non-wage household income, including  public transfers,
pensions,  interest and dividends, is not a significant  predictor of participation  in the labor market
conditional on age and education in the APIS sample. Note, finally,  that as is well-known,  the Heckman-
corrected estimates assume homoskedasticity  and joint normality in the residuals  from the swithching  and
wage regressions.
12education as a control, and within-sibling  estimates. Finally, I estimate a very flexible
regression model in which the log of the individual  wage rate is regressed on a set of 15
schooling dummies, 10 experience  dummies, and 150 interactions between experience
and schooling:
(3)  logWis 5 = -qx  Si, + Os  Xi  +  sx  '  (Si  *  Xix)  + Visx,
where the subscripts i, s, and x stand for individuals,  years of schooling, and experience
cohort.' 2 An important appeal of this approach  is that it allows the effect of education  on
wages to vary by experience (see Card 1999,  pp. 1805-06). An obvious limitation is that
this estimation strategy will produce noisy estimates in the absence of very large sample
sizes.
5.  Results
I present summary statistics on the sample of wage-earning men in the APIS in
Table 1, non-parametric density estimates  of the logarithm of the wage distribution in
Figure 1, and histograms for the years of completed  schooling in Figure 2. These results
are weighted  by the appropriate  expansion  factors, and are presented for four groups: All
men who report earning wages, men aged 25-65, the sub-sample  of men for whom we
12 Years of experience have been lumped together into five-year groups, such that the first group
(experience  = 1) corresponds to workers with 0 to 5 years of experience, the second group (experience  = 2)
corresponds  to workers with 6 to 10 years of experience,  and so on.  I do this to avoid the very small
sample sizes which would have resulted had I created dummy variables for every year of experience. This
model therefore estimates 160 coefficients  (fifteen dummy variables have to be dropped to avoid perfect
colinearity).
13have information  on the number of years of completed  schooling of both parents, and the
sub-sample  of men for whom we have information  on education and earnings for
themselves as well as at least one male sibling. Table 1 shows that men in these last two
categories  tend to be much younger:  The mean age is 33 for all wage-earning  men, 38 for
men aged 25 to 65, 22 for men for whom information  on parental education is available,
and 23 years for the sample of male siblings. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of log
wages is approximately  normal for all four groups, with means at 2.71 (all men), 2.86
(men aged 25 to 65), 2.36 (men with data on parental  education), and 2.39 (men with data
on male siblings). The lower mean wages of the younger men are, presumably, a result
of less years of labor market experience, as well as of the fact that these younger men
have slightly less education  (8.5 years and 8.12 years, respectively, rather than 8.8 years
for all wage-earning men in the sample, or 9.1 years for men aged 25 to 65). Figure 2
shows that these means hide important spikes in the distribution. In the full sample, for
example, 19.9% of the men have completed  exactly six years of education, 25.5% have
completed exactly ten years, and 12.5%  have completed exactly fifteen years,
corresponding  to completion of primary school, secondary school, and university,
respectively  (histograms  for the other three samples  are very similar, and are available
from the author upon request).
Tables 2 presents the results from estimating the spline function models for the
sample of Filipino men in the APIS. I present six sets of results, corresponding  to
specifications  for all males reporting wage earnings,  with and without provincial
dummies (columns 1 and 2), and for the smaller sample of men aged 25 to 65 (column 3).
Results for the full model, including the years-of-education  dummy variables, are
14reported in the upper panel of the table, while results without these dumnies are reported
in the lower panel.
A number of things are worth noting about the results in Table 2. First, a joint F-
test shows that the more flexible spline function is a significant  improvement  in fit over
the prototypical  Mincerian equation in all of the specifications. Second, the mean wage
premium appears to vary considerably  by level. The continuous  spline specification  for
the full sample of men, for example,  indicates that this premium is smallest for primary
education (.094), slightly larger for secondary  education  (.100), although the increase is
not significant,  and much larger for tertiary education  (.167), a change in slope which is
significant  at any conventional level. This would suggest considerable convexity in the
relationship  between the wage rate and years of completed schooling. Third, there appear
to be large, significant sheepskin effects, especially at the university level.  In the full
sample, these range from .121 for primary school, to .129 for secondary school, to a
whopping .276 for university. Note that these estimated sheepskin effects may be biased
down if some individuals do not earn degrees  even if they have completed the required
number of years of schooling,  and others earn degrees  even if they have not completed
exactly 6, 10, or 15 years of schooling. 13 Adding provincial dummies to the regressions
increases the difference between the mean wage premium associated with an additional
year of primary school (.062) and a year of university (.171), and greatly reduces the
sheepskin effects at the primary and secondary  levels (but not university).
The results based on the semi-parametric  regressions in equation (2), presented in
Table 3 and Figure 4, are quite consistent with those reported in Table 2. These estimates
15show clear differences between the mean (unweighted)  step size for primary school
(.089) and university (.167); a flattening of the earnings function at the primary and
secondary  levels when provincial  dummies are included; and very large sheepskin effects
associated with graduation from university.
Tables 4 and 5, finally, present the results which include parental education as
controls  (columns 1 and 2), and the within-sibling  estimates (columns 3 and 4).
Differences  between these results and those in Tables 2 and 3 could be caused by
inclusion of the additional controls,  as well as by differences  in the sample. In order to
hold constant the effect of differences in the sample,  I therefore present results for the
smaller samples  both with and without  the additional  controls. These results show, first,
that the education  of both parents has a significant,  positive impact on log wages, with
the effect of father's education being noticeably  (and significantly)  larger.'4 Second, all
of the coefficients  on own schooling  are smaller in these specifications  which attempt  to
control for ability. The coefficient  on primary education,  for example, drops from .094 to
.078 when parental education  is included as a control, and from .103 to .086 in the
within-sibling  regression. Similarly,  the coefficient on university education drops from
.196 to .162 in the regression which includes parental education,  and from .176 to .158 in
the within-sibling  regression. Third, the estimated sheepskin effects are quite robust to
the inclusion of controls for parental education. However, there appears to be something
peculiar in the sample of men with wage-earning  siblings:  The coefficient on the
13 Jaeger  and Page (1996), for example, find much larger sheepskin effects than those reported by
Hungerford  and Solon (1987) when they use information on both years of schooling and actual degree
awarded for a sample of workers in the United States.
14 Contrast  this with the results in Heckman and Hotz (1986), who find that mother's schooling has a larger
impact than father's schooling  on wages for a sample of Panamanian  men.
16university  graduation effect is greatly reduced in size and becomes insignificant  in this
sample, both when siblings' education  is included as a control, and when it is not, while
the coefficient on the all-but-last  year of schooling  in the semi-parametric  regression is
very large (.476 to .585), and significant at the 10% level or better.
What explains the convexity of the earnings  function for Filipino men? I consider
three possible explanations: Heterogeneity  bias associated  with ability, a supply-demand
mismatch,  and differences in the quality of education  received at different levels.
Individual heterogeneity can lead both to an upward-biased  estimate of the effect of
schooling  on earnings, as well as to the appearance  of convexity in a cross-sectional
regression in the absence of convexity in the underlying  earnings functions. The results
in Tables 4 and 5 show that the coefficients  on own schooling are indeed smaller in the
regressions which include controls for parental education,  as well as in the within-sibling
regressions, but the ratio of the university-to-primary-school  coefficients-a  measure of
the degree of convexity in the earnings function-is  virtually unchanged. The fact that
the estimated convexity is unchanged suggests  either that these supplemental  regressions
do a poor job controlling for heterogeneity  bias in the slope of the earnings function, or
that heterogeneity is not the main reason for convexity in this sample of Filipino men. 15
An alternative  explanation for the estimated  convexity is that the high rates of
return to tertiary education are the result of differences in the relative demand for and
supply of workers with different amounts of education. Some support for this idea is
15 One limitation  of these regressions is that it is not clear ex ante whether these partial controls for ability
should minimize  differences in the intercept  or the slope of the earnings function across individuals. This
is unfortunate,  as only differences  in the underlying slopes lead to (estimated)  convexity in cross-sectional
regressions. A second limitation  is that both approaches-controlling  for parental education, and within-
sibling estimates-reduce  the signal-to-noise  ratio, and will therefore  tend to aggravate  measurement error
in own schooling  (for example, Griliches 1977;  Lam and Schoeni 1993).
17given by gross enrollment  figures for the Philippines:  Between 1980 and 1997, gross
enrollment  ratios increased in primary school (by 4.4%, from 113 to 118) and secondary
school (by 15.4%, from 65 to 75), and decreased at the tertiary level (by 19.2%,  from 26
to 21) (Asian Development  Bank and World Bank 1999,  p. 149).16  Moreover, these
changes  in supply took place at a time when, if anything, there appears to have been an
increase in the demand for more skilled workers  in the Philippines-for  example,  in the
booming electronics sector.' 7
Finally, there may be large differences  in quality across education  levels in the
Philippines,  with higher quality education  being provided  in university (for a general
discussion  of this issue see Strauss  and Thomas 1995,  pp. 1971-72, as well as Behrman
and Birdsall 1983). If there are indeed quality differentials,  these could be related to a
quality-diluting  expansion  in primary and secondary  enrollments. Whether the fact that a
higher fraction of university education  than primary or secondary  education is provided
16 However, gross  enrollment  rates  at the tertiary level in the Philippines  were well above those of its
neighbors  throughout the 1990's, including Thailand,  China, Indonesia, and Malaysia  (but not Korea)
(World  Development  Indicators database,  The World Bank). There is also some discrepancy  between these
figures and those in the World Development  Indicators  database, which actually show an increasing
enrollment  ratio for tertiary education  in the Philippines  over the 1990's. The difference between these
estimates  appears to be that the World Development  Indicators  include enrollment in non-university  tertiary
institutions,  whereas  the Asian Development  Bank and World Bank (1999) report do not. Alternatively,  I
could have used data on educational  attainment (rather  than enrollment),  such as those found in Barro and
Lee (1993)  or Nehru, Swanson and Dubey (1994), for the comparisons  in this paper. These data sets have
been criticized on numerous grounds (Behrman  and Rosenzweig 1994). For the purposes of my analysis,
the main disadvantage  of these data sets is that they do not provide  post-1987 data.  See also Pritchett
(1996).
17 Disaggregated  data on sector of employment,  which was collected in the APIS but was not available for
this paper, might help clarify this point by showing  whether there were large differences in wage premia
across sectors. Pritchett (1996), for example, argues that the rate of return to education is generally  highest
in sectors  in which there is exogenous  technological  progress. Amongst  other evidence, he cites work by
Foster and Rosenzweig  (1996) on India, which suggests that rates of return to education went up in villages
where the Green Revolution brought agricultural  innovation,  but not in technologically-stable  villages.
18by the private sector also has implications  for quality is a matter of conjecture, although
Jimenez et. al. (1995) argue that this is plausible.' 8
What accounts for the very large sheepskin  effects found in the Philippines? Here,
too, I discuss three possibilities:  Credentialism,  differences  in the actual amount of
learning acquired by students who complete  the last year within a given level, rather than
any intervening  year, and discontinuities  in ability associated with discontinuities  in the
cost of education  across levels.
Credentialism and signaling are the most-frequently  cited explanations in the
literature for the presence of measured sheepskin effects in the United States. Referring
to the original Hungerford and Solon (1987) article, Belman and Heywood (1991, p. 720)
write that "the finding that a diploma had value independent  from the accumulated  years
of education indicated that in addition to any role it plays actually making workers more
productive, education also credentiates workers  as more productive". In the Philippines,
where information  in the labor market is likely to be far less accurate than in the United
States, credentialism  of this sort may be even more important. One reasonable question
might be what kinds of employers  reward credentials. Separate estimation of
discontinuous  spline functions  for government  and private sector employees for the full
sample of men show a university graduation effect that is more than twice as large in the
private sector (.343, significant  at the 0.1I%  level) as in the public sector (.153, significant
at the 5% level). This is similar to the pattern found in the United States (Heywood
1994),  but different from that found in some African countries, where sheepskin effects
18 Moreover, a large fraction of students  currently attending university in the Philippines are enrolled in
technical subjects,  such as engineering,  which are likely to be associated with high rates of return (World
Bank 2000, pp. 15-16).
19appear to be larger in the public sector than in the private sector (on Ghana, see Glewwe
1996,  who also cites similar results for Kenya and Tanzania  in Boissiere et. al. 1985).
A second explanation for the sheepskin  effects may be that there are differences in
the "difficulty"  of years within a given level, and therefore in the amount of learning
which actually takes place. For example, if there are more rigorous exams at the end of
the last year within a cycle, completing  this last year may lead to a greater marginal
increase in human  capital than completing  any other intervening  year, and may therefore
be rewarded disproportionately  by rational employers  in the labor market. There is some
anecdotal  evidence in the Philippines  that passing the last year within a given cycle may
be more difficult than passing preceding years, especially  at the university level.
Finally, there may be sharp discontinuities  in ability in the transition years between
education  cycles.' 9 In the Philippines there appear  to be very large differences in the
direct private costs of education  across levels. Table 6 shows that the private unit costs
of education increase steeply by level: The mean unit cost of primary education is 898
pesos, while the mean unit cost of tertiary education  is 13,334  pesos-almost  10% of
mean household consumption. There are even larger differences in the unit costs for a
given education level by per capita consumption  quintile: The richest households spend
more than 20 times as much as the poorest households  for every child in primary school,
and more than 10 times as much for every child in university.20  To see how these
19  I thank Jere R. Behrman  for this suggestion.
20 1 would particularly like to thank Hans Hoogeven  for help with this calculation. Disaggregated  data on
the private costs of education  per household are available  in the 1997  Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES),  but not in the 1998 APIS, while data on household  composition,  including the number of
children attending different education  levels are available in the APIS, but not in the FIES. I use the panel
of households included in both the FIES and APIS to estimate the private unit cost of primary, secondary,
and tertiary education  by running an auxiliary  regression of the total amount spent by a household on
education in 1997 on the number  of children  attending each education  level in 1998: Exh  = PPh  + ySh + BTh
+ ch,  where Ex is the total amount spent by household  h on education in 1997,  P, S, and T are the total
20discontinuities  in costs could interact with the distribution of ability, consider the
simplest of examples-one  in which there are three populations,  a "poor" population,
which can only afford primary schooling,  a "medium"  population, which can afford
primary and secondary schooling  (but not university), and a "rich" population, which can
afford primary, secondary,  and tertiary schooling. Figure 5 shows a hypothetical
example  in which ability is assumed to rise with years of schooling, and to reach the
same maximum  for those students who are attending the highest year of schooling they
can afford. In this example,  discontinuities  in costs, which result in a cut-off in the
amount of schooling which different populations  can afford, lead to discontinuities  in the
distribution of aggregate ability (the heavy line in the graph)-where  aggregate ability is
simply the weighted average of the ability of "poor", "medium", and "rich" students for a
given year of schooling. If unobserved  ability is rewarded  in the labor market, as seems
likely, then the discontinuities  in ability could result in discontinuities  in the earnings
function. Note, however, that the hypothetical  distribution of ability in Figure 5 would
lead to inordinately "low" earnings for those with only the first year(s) of secondary
number  of children  in household  h who  are attending  primary  school,  secondary  school,  and  university  in
1998,  and  the constant  in the regression  has  been  suppressed.  The  parameters  0, y, and  8 will  provide  a
reasonable approximation  to the private unit costs, by level, if attendance rates in 1998  are close to those in
1997. This procedure assumes that household composition,  the fraction of children who are attending
school at every level, and actual (rather  than measured)  unit costs remained constant between 1997 and
1998. There is no reason to suppose that household composition or unit costs changed in the Philippines
between 1997 and 1998. Attendance  rates may have dropped, however, because of the effect of the East
Asian crisis on incomes in 1998,  even though the Philippines was much less affected by the crisis than
other countries  in the region. Administrative  data show no significant impact of the crisis on enrollment
rates in primary or secondary  school; but attendance  rates may still have fallen if households were more
likely to keep their children at home or doing odd jobs.  A weaker assumption  for the calculation  of unit
costs is that attendance  rates in primary school, secondary  school,  and university in 1998 are a constant
fraction  of attendance  rates in 1997,  such that Ep 98
=  MIEP
97, Es 98
=  VE.97, and EC9' =  WE, 97, where the
subscripts  stand for education levels, superscripts for  years, and the parameter N'  is less than one. Under
this assumption,  the proposed estimation  procedure  will over-estimate  unit costs by a factor 1/,  but will
produce accurate estimates of the ratio of unit costs across levels.
21school or university,  rather than to inordinately "high" earnings for those who have
completed exactly the last year of schooling  within a given level.
Two other features of the estimated sheepskin  effects in the Philippines are worth
noting. First, Tables 3 and 5, and Figure 3 all show that the estimated sheepskin effects
in the Philippines  do not appear to be the result of a particularly small increase in
earnings  for those who have all-but-the-last  year of schooling  within a given level (that
is, people with 5, 9, or 14 years of education),  something  which has been argued  for the
United States (Park 1994).21  Second, there is no evidence  that sheepskin effects diminish
with experience in the Philippines. In Figure 4, I present  results based on an estimation
of equation (3) above for the full sample of men. Each point on a graph corresponds  to
the expected earnings for a given combination  of education and experience, while the
vertical lines correspond to six years of education (completed  primary) and ten years of
education  (completed secondary). The results, which can be quite noisy because of the
small sample sizes in some cells, show no clear pattern in the relationship between
sheepskin effects and experience:  The wage premia associated with completion of the last
year of university  are .504, .374, .387, .213, .355, .488, .180, .240, -.010, and 1.083  for
the first through tenth experience cohorts. 22
21 As noted  above,  the results  based  on the sample  of male  siblings  are particularly  confusing  because  the
largest wage premium is associated with the all-but-last  year of university.
22 Belman  and Heywood  (1997) suggest that sheepskin  effects in the United States appear to become
attenuated  with experience,  although there is no clear evidence  of such attenuation in the results presented
by Heckman,  Layne-Farrar,  and Todd (1996, pp. 585-89)  using the 1970,  1980, and 1990 US Censuses.
Another way of estimating the effect of experience  on credentials,  suggested to me by Harold Alderman,
would interact the dummy variables D6, DIO, and D15 in the discontinuous  spline specification  with
experience. The results from such an estimation  strategy show that the coefficients  on these interactions
tend to be significantly  negative for graduation  from primary school and secondary school, and
significantly  positive for graduation  from university. Note that the experience variable, as constructed,  is
simply a function of age and education. Unfortunately,  the 1998 APIS does not include questions about the
amount of time a worker has spent in his current job, which might be more relevant for these calculations.
22Note, finally, that it is impossible to disentangle  age, cohort, and year effects wih a
single  cross-section  of data. Consider, for example, the ratio of the slopes of the earnings
function for workers  with university  education  relative to workers with primary
education. This ratio appears  to be noticeably  larger in the graphs in the second panel of
Figure 4 than those in the first panel. This difference  in the relative slopes could be the
result of an improvement in the quality of primary school which has affected recent labor
market entrants-a  cohort effect-or  the fact that the relatively low returns to primary
school only bite later on in a worker's life-an  age effect. 23
6.  Conclusion
There is considerable  evidence which suggests an increase in the mean rate of
return to education  over time, increasing convexity in the earnings function, and large,
significant  sheepskin effects in education  in the United States. Similar work on LDC's is
still far from the norm-even  though the supply-demand  mismatches, and the poor
information  flows in the labor market which are (some of the possible) explanations  for
non-linearities  in the earnings function are likely to be much more serious problems  in
these countries than in the United States.
This paper adds to the literature by exploiting a recently-available,  high-quality
data set, the 1998 Philippines APIS survey. I show that there are large differences in the
wage premia across education levels, and very large, significant sheepskin effects
23 Farber and Gibbons (1996) present recent evidence  for the United States which suggests that the effect of
education  on log wages diminishes with experience,  although  it is not clear how the relative earnings of
workers with different amounts of education  change with experience.
23associated with completion of the last year within  a level for Filipino men. The results
are reasonably robust to partial controls for ability, such as inclusion of measures  of
parental education, and within-sibling  estimates. These findings have important possible
implications  for the decisions taken by private individuals as well as governments. For
example,  at reasonable discount rates, a very high degree of convexity in the earnings
function could make further education  unattractive  for all but those who expect to
complete the highest years of schooling. 24
Returns to education are not static, in the Philippines  or elsewhere, and the shape of
the earnings function may well change over time. 25 Additional  research on a developing
country with numerous cross-sections  of data would allow for distinctions to be made
between the age, cohort, and year effects which underlie changes in the relative shape of
the earnings function.
24 One puzzling question which this paper does not address  is how the high education levels and the
reasonably  high overall returns to education  are consistent  with the declining productivity  and very low
levels of growth found in the Philippines  in the last two decades (for a general discussion, see Pritchett
1996).
25 Indeed,  because 1998  was a year in which the Philippine economy  was affected by the East Asian crisis,
it might not be a representative  year to study  the relationship  between wages and education-even  though
the effects of the crisis were nowhere near in magnitude to those felt by many of the Philippines'
neighbors: The year-on-year change in real GDP per capita for the third quarter of 1998,  corresponding  to
the period for the wage data in our sample, was only -2.2%.
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28Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable  Median  Mean  Standard
Deviation
ALL MEN
Log Hourly Wage Rate (1998 Filipino pesos)  2.75  2.71  .859
Weekly Hours Worked  43.69  41.12  15.08
Age  33  34.29  12.38
Years of Completed Schooling  9  8.78  3.56
MEN AGED 25 TO 65
Log Hourly Wage Rate (1998 Filipino pesos)  2.89  2.86  .821
Weekly Hours Worked  44.31  42.34  14.25
Age  38  38.96  9.77
Years of Completed Schooling  10  9.06  3.62
MEN WITH AVAILABLE DATA ON PARENTAL EDUCATION
Log Hourly Wage Rate (1998 Filipino pesos)  2.36  2.39  .909
Weekly Hours Worked  40.62  37.09  16.53
Age  22  22.20  5.65
Years of Completed Schooling  9  8.53  3.58
MEN WITH AVAILABLE DATA ON SIBLING EDUCATION AND EARNINGS
Log Hourly Wage Rate (1998 Filipino pesos)  2.39  2.38  .844
Weekly Hours Worked  40.62  37.78  16.17
Age  23  23.67  6.56
Years of Completed Schooling  8  8.12  3.44
Note: Author's  calculations  based  on the APIS tapes, taking into account the weighted  nature of the data.
29Table 2: Returns  to Education, Spline Specification
Specification
1  2  3
Experience  .043***  .044***  .036***
(.001)  (.001)  (.002)
Squared  Experience  (x 100)  -.060***  -.061***  -.050***
(.003)  (.002)  (.004)
Years of Completed  Schooling  .062***  .054***  .058***
(.011)  (.010)  (.013)
Dummy  for S> = 6 (D6)  .121***  .031  .098**
(.031)  (.027)  (.036)
D6 * (S-6)  .008  .008  .008
(.013)  (.011)  (.015)
Dummy  for S>  = 10  (D1O)  .129***  .047*  .124***
(.025)  (.021)  (.030)
D1O  * (S-10)  .043***  .058***  .042***
(.010)  (.009)  (.012)
Dummy  for S = 15  .276***  .269***  .288***
(.037)  (.032)  (.040)
Provincial  Dummies  No  Yes  No
R-squared  .311  .489  .267
F-test  48.37***  112.27***  46.81***
Number  of observations  21,765  21,765  16,738
Experience  043***  .044***  .036***
(.001)  (.001)  (.002)
Squared  Experience  (x 100)  -.060***  -.060***  -.049***
(.003)  (.002)  (.004)
Years of Completed  Schooling  .094***  .062***  .084***
(.006)  (.005)  (.007)
D6 * (S-6)  .006  .007  .009
(.008)  (.007)  (.009)
D10  * (S-10)  .067***  .102***  .072***
(.006)  (.005)  (.007)
Provincial  Dummies  No  Yes  No
R-squared  .308  .487  .264
F-test  81.80***  263.40***  84.99***
Number  of observations  21,765  21,765  16,738
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. Coefficients and standard errors corrected for
heteroskedasticity  and clustering are reported in parentheses. Specifications 1 and 2 include all men who
report earning wage income; Specification  3 is limited to men aged 25 to 65.  A constant was estimated  but
is not reported.
F-test: F-test in top panel is joint F-test on the two interaction  terms and the three dummy variables,  F-test
in bottom panel is  joint F-test on the two interaction  terms only.
* Significant  at the 5% level; ** Significant  at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level.
30Table 3: Returns to Education,  Semi-Parametric  Specification
Specification
1  2  3
Experience  .043***  .044***  .036***
(.001)  (.001)  (.002)
Squared  Experience  (x 100)  -.060***  -.061***  -.050***
(.003)  (.002)  (.000)
S=1  .100  .089  -.049
(.153)  (.128)  (.164)
2  .024  .052  -.001
(.072)  (.060)  (.079)
3  .138**  .110  .180**
(.049)  (.042)  (.058)
4  .017  .033  -.014
(.037)  (.030)  (.044)
5  .061  .025  .072
(.033)  (.029)  (.040)
6  .193***  .102***  .163***
(.028)  (.023)  (.031)
7  .049  .087***  .021
(.029)  (.025)  (.036)
8  .072*  .026  .088*
(.033)  (.028)  (.040)
9  .097**  .077**  .103**
(.030)  (.024)  (.034)
10  .187***  .105***  .175***
(.023)  (.019)  (.026)
11  .086**  .125***  .084
(.033)  (.028)  (.038)
12  .141***  .119***  .113**
(.037)  (.031)  (.042)
13  .110**  .132***  .142***
(.037)  (.031)  (.039)
14  .118  .055  .128
(.073)  (.062)  (.078)
15  .382***  .441***  .361***
(.070)  (.059)  (.074)
Provincial Dummies  No  Yes  No
R-squared  .312  .489  .268
Number  of observations  21,765  21,765  16,738
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. Coefficients  and standard errors corrected for
heteroskedasticity  and clustering are reported in parentheses. Specifications 1 and 2 include all men who
report earning wage income; Specification  3 is limited to men aged 25 to 65; Specifications  4 and 5 are
limited to men whose relationship  to the household head is "son" in households in which both the
household  head and his or her spouse are members  and report their education levels. A constant was
estimated  but is not reported.
* Significant  at the 5% level; ** Significant  at the 1% level; *** Significant  at the 0.1% level.
31Table 4: Returns to Education,  Spline Specification,  Controls for Parental
Education  and "Within"  Estimators
Parental education  controls  "Within" estimators
1  2  3  4
Experience  .058***  .060***  .045***  .043***
(.008)  (.008)  (.006)  (.006)
Squared  Experience  (x 100)  -.121***  -.128***  -.083***  -.080***
(.033)  (.032)  (.017)  (.017)
Years of Completed Schooling  .055  .043  .061**  .048*
(.031)  (.032)  (.028)  (.028)
Dummy for S> = 6 (D6)  .156  .142  .169**  .156**
(.091)  (.090)  (.077)  (.077)
D6 * (S-6)  .039  .038  -.014  -.013
(.039)  (.040)  (.036)  (.035)
Dummy for S> = 10 (D10)  .135  .137  .179**  .169**
(.072)  (.071)  (.075)  (.074)
D1O  * (S-10)  .033  .014  .092**  .086**
(.040)  (.038)  (.038)  (.037)
Dummy for S = 15  .340*  .336*  .177  .183
(.164)  (.158)  (.153)  (.152)
Father's  Education  --  .027***  --  --
(.007)
Mother's  Education  --  .014*  --  --
(.007)
Total education  of siblings  --  --  --  .009**
(.003)
R-squared  .352  .367  .264  .268
F-test  8.50***  5.62***  7.02***  6.66***
Number  of observations  2,355  2,355  2,851  2,851
Experience  .059***  .061***  .046***  .044***
(.008)  (.008)  (.006)  (.006)
Squared Experience (x 100)  -.124***  -.131***  .082***  .080***
(.032)  (.032)  (.017)  (.017)
Years of Completed Schooling  .094***  .078***  .103***  .086***
(.019)  (.020)  (.018)  (.018)
D6 * (S-6)  .035  .037  -.007  -.006
(.026)  (.026)  (.024)  (.024)
D10  * (S-10)  .067***  .047**  .080***  .078***
(.018)  (.018)  (.019)  (.019)
Father's  Education  --  .027***  --  --
(.007)
Mother's  Education  --  .014
(.007)
Total education of male siblings  --  --  .009***
(.006)
R-squared  .348  .364  .260  .265
F-test  14.81***  8.43***  11.57***  11.35***
Number  of observations  2,355  2,355  2,851  2,851
Note: See note at foot of Table 2 for explanation  of coefficients,  standard errors, test statistics, and levels of
significance. Specifications  1 and 2 are limited to men whose  relationship to the household head is "son"
in households in which both the household head and his spouse are members and report their education
levels. Specifications  3 and 4 are limited to men in households  with at least two wage-earning male
siblings. Provincial dumnies are not included in the regressions.
32Table 5: Returns to Education,  Semi-Parametric  Specification, Controls  for
Parental Education  and "Within"  Estimators
Parental  education  controls  "Within"  estimators
1  2  3  4
Experience  .058***  .060***  .045***  .044***
(.008)  (.008)  (.006)  (.006)
Squared Experience (x 100)  -.123***  -.129***  -.080***  -.080**
(.033)  (.032)  (.017)  (.017)
S =1  -.127  -.197  -.160  -.145
(.272)  (.282)  (.290)  (.292)
2  .169  .187  .194  .159
(.224)  (.238)  (.230)  (.229)
3  -.093  -.120  -.017  -.018
(.129)  (.133)  (.114)  (.114)
4  .124  .117  .103  .088
(.104)  (.104)  (.080)  (.080)
5  .078  .065  .057  .045
(.087)  (.086)  (.072)  (.072)
6  .208*  .182*  .222***  .199***
(.082)  (.081)  (.068)  (.069)
7  .005  -.011  .051  .037
(.075)  (.074)  (.069)  (.068)
8  .153  .136  .099  .091
(.084)  (.083)  (.079)  (.078)
9  .137  .132  -.034  -.046
(.081)  (.080)  (.082)  (.082)
10  .206**  .191**  .257***  .236***
(.066)  (.065)  (.069)  (.069)
11  .065  .016  .157*  .139
(.091)  (.090)  (.091)  (.088)
12  .163  .140  .151  .142
(.109)  (.108)  (.109)  (.108)
13  .231  .217  -.051  -.052
(.203)  (.196)  (.181)  (.181)
14  .047  -.004  .585**  .476*
(.450)  (.401)  (.254)  (.257)
15  .466  .427  .031  .092
(.409)  (.358)  (.199)  (.198)
Father's education  --  .027***  ---
(.007)
Mother's education  .015*
(.007)
Total education of male siblings  --  --  --  .008
R-squared  .353  .369  .266  .269
Number of observations  2,355  2,355  2,851  2,851
Note: See note at foot of Table  3 for explanation  of coefficients,  standard  errors, test statistics,  and levels of
significance.  Specifications  1 and 2 are limited  to men whose relationship  to the household  head is "son"
in households  in which both the household head and his spouse are members  and report their  education
levels.  Specifications  3 and 4 are limited to men in households  with at least two wage-earning  male
siblings.  Provincial  dummies  are not included in the regressions.
33Table 6: Direct private  costs of education, by education level and consumption
quintile
All HH  Quintile
1  2  3  4  5
(poorest)  (richest)
Unit costs (per student)  898  270  469  771  1589  5536
Primary
% of total HH consumption  0.7%  0.6%  0.7%  0.9%  1.3%  2.0%
Unit costs (per siudent)  2745  661  1263  1696  3052  7295
Secondary
% of total HH consumption  2.0%  1.5%  1.9%  1.9%  2.4%  2.6%
Unit costs (per student)  13334  1879  3487  5690  8512  20355
Tertiary
% of total HH consumption  9.7%  4.1%  5.3%  6.5%  6.8%  7.2%
Note: Quintiles  are 1997  per capita consumption quintiles.
34Figure 1: Density estimates of Mean Log Hourly Wages
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35Figure 3: Mean Log Hourly Wage, by Years of Completed Schooling
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Note: Coefficients  for line labeled "all men (i)" come  from a regression  without provincial dummies,  while
coefficients  for line labeled "all men (ii)" are from a regression  with provincial dummies. Coefficients  for
line labeled "Men with data on parental education  (i)" come from a regression limited to the sample of men
for whom data on parents' schooling  are available,  but do not include controls for parental schooling;
coefficients  for line labeled "Men with data on parental education  (ii)" come from a regression with this
same  sample which includes controls for parental education. The intercept for each of the lines includes
the effect of experience at the mean of the sample.
36Figure 4: Mean Log Hourly Wage, by Experience Category and Years of Completed Schooling
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37Figure 5: Hypothetical Distribution of Ability, by Socio-Economic Class and Years of
Completed Schooling
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